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one of the greatest war photographers
of all time. His relationship with the
similarly gifted and prominent photographer Gerda Taro (Gerta Pohorylle)
forms much of the central narrative
of the book. Finally, American novelists, journalists, and war correspondents Ernest Hemingway and Martha
Gellhorn are the third couple, rounding
out the book’s six main characters.
Hotel Florida is much more than just an
account of the Spanish Civil War—or
the story of the six main characters
during those years. It is as much a story
about the nature of truth and reality in
wartime as it is a gripping narrative of
the seminal conflict of the interwar years
in Europe. Vaill’s characters become who
they are through their interaction with
the war, and they create themselves—
and the meaning of their own lives—as
much as they create accounts of the war’s
events, whether through the written
word or the photograph. Their stories
and pictures are in many cases used for
propaganda purposes, and the characters know this. However, the fine line
between truth and propaganda largely
disappears, if it is ever distinguishable
in the first place. With the exception of
Barea and Kulcsar, the characters want
to be close to the fighting, to see the
troops and the refugees and the destruction caused by the war, so that they can
capture its meaning and portray the
tragedy to the world, which does not
seem to understand the importance
of defeating fascism. A host of minor
characters appear, many of whom are
fighters in the various International Brigades (to include the famous Abraham
Lincoln Battalion of American volunteers). These characters might as well
have walked right out of a Hemingway
novel—tough whiskey drinkers hunting
fascists and eating trout and vegetables
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cooked over a fire. In fact Hotel Florida
itself reads like a novel, and it is no
irony that the book concludes with the
first sentence of For Whom the Bell Tolls
as Hemingway begins to type the first
page, transferring his Spanish experience into his greatest literary work.
This book offers something for not
only the student of European history,
military history, or literature. It is a
first-rate account of the political and
military events of the Spanish Civil
War. It is also a deeply philosophical
examination of the relationship among
war, truth, and propaganda. It asks hard
questions that are immediately relevant
today even as the media landscape has
changed dramatically; the fundamentals
of human nature have remained such
that any of the main characters of this
book could sympathize with reporters,
photographers, and journalists today. I
highly recommend this brilliant book
to scholars and general readers alike.
JEFFREY M. SHAW

Bayles, Martha. Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image Abroad. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2014. 336pp. $30

This is a wonderful, wonderful book.
It is very much more than even its
title and subtitle suggest. And it’s a
great read even though it deals with
subjects and policy debates about
which most of us would rather not
think because they’re either upsetting, or too complicated, or both.
The first half of the book is devoted
to the image of America that our low
(and getting lower all the time) popular culture projects worldwide. When
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I embarked on reading it, I was intimidated by how much of our popular
culture Martha Bayles proposed to cover
in detail by focusing on (seemingly) so
many individual products. I felt I already
knew how vulgar and vile the movies and television shows we export are.
When the author started in on Sex in the
City, I thought, “Well, better her than me
at least: somebody needs to know about
this particular offense, but not me.”
Then, I discovered that Bayles very cleverly combined her assessment of how
that television program gives a debased
view of America with the reactions of
interviewees abroad. Every example (and
there is a myriad of them in chapters
“The American Way of Sex,” “Empire
of Special Effects,” “Television by the
People, for the People?,” and “From Pop
Idol to Vox Populi”) proceeds in this
way. While she means us to look at and
understand the attraction of and “push
back” against American pop culture
from place to place abroad, she provides
excellent analyses of the indigenous pop
culture and non-American influences.
This takes one into society and politics
as much as culture, religion, taste, and
inevitable interesting peculiarities. The
outcome is a nearly complete global
vision of popular culture that I don’t
believe can be found anywhere else. Of
course, Bayles means to show the guiding influence of American pop culture.
In dealing with popular culture, Bayles
is slyly operating in the way in which
she will eventually commend that public
(or culture) diplomats proceed. She
holds that public diplomacy is made up
of four activities: listening, advocacy,
culture and exchange, and news reporting. These ought to be discrete from one
another but given equal importance.
Accordingly, a cultural officer ought to
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be able to tell foreigners how Americans
really regard Sex in the City (no one
takes the show as real or expressive of
his or her attitude toward life); be able
to explain how certain things fit (or
don’t fit) into the real American ethos
(this is the advocacy part); know enough
about the local culture to understand
the “push back” that should always be
sought; and, finally, tell the truth.
In addition to the foregoing, this book
does several other things, and all of
them excellently. Bayles is well versed in
American political thought and history
—enough to produce a fine essay on
the American ethos that combines the
historical, political, and cultural into
what is really American. Again, this is
an example of what every U.S. public diplomat should know and what
those abroad might learn if public
diplomacy were properly practiced.
The book is also a thorough history of
U.S. public diplomacy, from the first
master, Benjamin Franklin, through the
shutting down of the U.S. Information
Agency (USIA) in 1999, to the present. While she believes the abolition of
the USIA was a mistake, the book does
not advocate its revival. This is because
Bayles is clearly more concerned with
the content of government-provided
information about America since the
early 1950s (which is a distressing history) than she is about the institutions.
On top of it all, Bayles treats most
related subjects—for example, the
experiment in “strategic communications” as a kind of public diplomacy
inflicted on the Department of Defense
after 9/11 (and terminated by Admiral
Michael Mullen, then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011); the history
of the tight relationship between Hollywood and Washington that secured
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the worldwide domination of American
pop culture, while allowing its content
to sink lower and lower; the troubled
career of U.S. international broadcast;
and the Internet and social media.
And yes, she deals also with the problem
of U.S. promotion of democracy abroad.
To quote from the last sentences of the
book: “The premise of this book has
been that a significant number, perhaps
even a preponderance, of today’s tiny
battles are being fought not in the news
media but in the mundane realm of
popular culture. The wisdom of America
is clear and straightforward: political
liberty can be sustained only by selfgoverning individuals and prudently
designed institutions. Yet when our
fellow human beings look at America
through the screen of our entertainment,
what they see most darkly is a rejection
of tradition, religion, family and every
kind of institutional restraint, in favor
of unseemly egotism and libertinism.
Attracted and repulsed by this image,
they might be forgiven for not appreciating the part about self-governance.”
KENNETH D. M. JENSEN
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be new ground raids into Cambodia
and Laos to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh
Trail—the network that allowed Hanoi
to supply communist forces in the
south, and that at its peak even included an oil pipeline from the Chinese
border to the environs of Saigon. The
raid into Laos, code-named LAM SON
719, is the subject of Robert Sander’s
recent book Invasion of Laos, 1971.
Despite the term “invasion” in the
book’s title, LAM SON 719 was designed
as a cross-border raid on the town of
Tchepone. It was here communist military supplies were shifted from trucks to
porters, bicycles, and pack animals. The
town had received attention from American military planners as early as the
Kennedy administration. Sander quotes
General Westmoreland explaining to
General Abrams in March 1968, “I’d like
to go to Tchepone, but I haven’t got the
tickets.” Westmoreland’s plans called for
at least four divisions to undertake the
assault. For its part, the government of
Saigon had been planning an operation
into Laos from at least 1965. In reality, as Sander notes, the United States
had been conducting CIA and covert
air operations in Laos since the 1950s.

Sander, Robert D. Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam
Son 719. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press,
2014. 304pp. $29.95

President Nixon’s policies of détente
and outreach to China meant a reduction of the chance that expanding the
war into “neutral” Laos would trigger Soviet or Chinese response.

“The only chance we have is to initiate
bold moves against the enemy,” national security adviser Henry Kissinger
confided in 1971. This was his advice to
the administration of President Nixon,
which sought to end the Vietnam War
by creating “peace with honor.” “Bold
moves” would include two new strategies. One was resumed bombing of
North Vietnam. The second would

Congressional restrictions designed
to limit the war meant that American
involvement in the 1971 operation
would be confined to supporting roles in
artillery and fire support. Yet, as Sander
points out, this was still a bloody battle
for the Americans. American casualties
ran high, with over two hundred killed
and at least 1,100 injured. Sander, who
was a pilot during the battle, observes
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